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A risk-averse US  investor ad-justs the shares of  a portfolio of  short-term 
nominal domestic and foreign assets to maximize expected utility.  The 
optimal strategy is to respond immediately to all new information which 
arrives weekly.  We  calculate  the  expected  utility  foregone when  the 
investor  abandons  the  optimal  strategy  and  instead  optimizes  less 
frequently.  We  also consider  the cases where the investor ignores the 
covariance between returns sourced in different countries, and where the 
investor  makes  unsystematic  mistakes  when forming  expectations  of 
exchange rate changes. 
We demonstrate that the expected utility cost of  sub-optimal behaviour is 
generally very small.  Thus, for example, if  investors adjust portfolio shares 
every three months, they incur an average expected utility loss equivalent to 
about 0.16% p.a.  It  is therefore plausible that slight opportunity costs of 
frequent optimization may outweigh the benefits. 
This result may help explain the failure of  uncovered interest parity. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Uncovered interest parity is one of  the linchpins of  modern exchange rate 
theory.  It follows from the joint  hypothesis that the foreign exchange 
market is efficient, that traders are risk-neutral and that transaction costs 
are negligible.  However, uncovered interest parity is overwhelmingly 
rejected by empirical evidence.1 
There are four possible interpretations of  the failure of  this joint hypothesis. 
The first, and most widely accepted, is that there is a time-varying risk 
premiun12required to hold a portfolio of  assets denominated in a range of 
currencies.  A model which incorporates risk premia and performs well 
empirically has, however, proven elusive (see for example, Hodrick (1987), 
Cumby (1988) and Baillie and Bollerslev (1990)). Furthermore, theory-based 
estimates of  risk premia turn out to be very small indeed (see Frankel (1985), 
Frankel (1988) and Smith and Gruen, (1989)). 
A second possibility is that the joint  hypothesis fails because of  a small 
sample bias or  'peso  problem'.  The suggestion here is that investors 
rationally estimate the ex ante probabilities of  events which, if  they occur, 
will  have  a significant impact  on the real return  from their portfolio. 
During the period under study, if  the events do not occur with a frequency 
consistent with their estimated probabilities, it will incorrectly appear that 
the investor's behaviour was irrational. 
1 See Hodrick  (1987) and Goodhart (1988) for international evidence with a range of 
currencies, or Smith and Gruen (1989) for the Australian/US exchange rate. 
2 The term 'risk premium'  is often used loosely to mean the excess return demanded 
by  investors to compensate them for the 'risk'  of  an exchange rate depreciation.  We 
use the term in its technical sense.  For a given expectation of  the return on an asset, 
the risk premium is the excess return required because of  the expected volatility of  the 
return and its expected correlation with the returns on other assets. A third possibility (Baldwin (1990)) is that small transaction costs combined 
with uncertainty can lead to an interest rate differential matched neither by 
a risk premium nor by  an expected exchange rate change.  Interest rate 
differentials within a small band do not set in motion the capital flows that 
would close the gap because transaction costs render the moving of  capital 
sub-optimal. 
The final possible interpretation of  the rejection of  uncovered interest parity 
is  that  the  foreign  exchange  market  is  not  efficient.  This  is  the 
interpretation we explore in this paper. 
We  consider the returns available to  a representative risk-averse fund- 
manager who maximizes a function of  mean and variance of  end-period 
wealth.  The investor chooses the shares held in different currencies by 
examining interest rates and expected changes in the exchange rate.  We 
discover that, in terms of  expected utility, the investor loses very little by 
exhibiting certain types of  'near-rational' behaviour (see Akerlof and Yellen 
(1985) for a definition of  near-rational).  If we then allow for the possibility 
of  small transaction  costs, the benefits of  being fully rational are even 
smaller. 
Initially, we  assume that the investor responds immediately to all new 
information  which  affects  expected  utility.  We  assume  that  new 
information arrives weekly.  We then explore three deviations from this 
strategy. 
In  the text  of  the paper, we estimate the cost of  changing the portfolio 
shares infrequently rather than  every time  new information  becomes 
available.  In  the Appendix, we examine two further examples of  near- 
rationality.  In these examples we assume that investors either: 
(i) take account of  the expected returns available in different countries and 
the variability of  those returns but ignore the covariances between them, or 
(ii) make small mistakes in forming expectations of  exchange rate changes. 
We estimate the expected utility cost of  each of these types of  near-rational 
behaviour using interest rate and exchange rate data over the period 1983 - 
1989.  The main  contribution of  the paper is to  show that the cost  of 
sluggishly adjusting portfolio shares over periods of  relevance to tests of 
uncovered interest parity is very small indeed.  We conclude that there are no strong grounds for  expecting that  the agents who engage in such 
behaviour  will be  driven from the market.  This provides a potential 
explanation for the failure of  uncovered interest parity. 
2. THE MODEL 
In  this section we derive the optimal allocation of  foreign assets in a 
representative US investor's portfolio.  We maximize expected utility in the 
coming week. 
The US investor maximizes a function of  the mean and variance of  end-of- 
period real wealth.  At  the beginning of  each week, all the information 
necessary to accurately forecast end-of-week real wealth is available, with 
the exception of  the exchange rate movements over the week.  Prices are 
not a source of  uncertainty by assumption. We allow assets denominated in 
US  Dollars,  Yen,  Deutschemarks, British pounds, Swiss francs and/or 
Australian dollars to be chosen for the portfolio. 
We contrast different strategies by investors within this model framework. 
The first 'rationalf strategy involves the investor maximizing  expected 
utility  by  choosing  portfolio  shares of  hypothetical weekly  securities 
denominated in the available currencies.  Relevant new information arrives 
weekly, and so this 'rational'  investor adjusts portfolio shares every week. 
At the end of  each week, the one-week securities mature and new ones are 
purchased.  We  assume  there  are  no  costs  associated  with  these 
transactions.  Because all the securities are turned over each week, the cost 
of  sub-optimal behaviour  arises from holding inappropriate shares of 
assets, rather than from being 'locked-inf at old interest rates (as would be 
the case if  the securities had a term of  more than a week). 
We now posit an expected utility function and maximize it with respect to 
the portfolio shares. The analysis follows Frankel and Engel (1984). We use 
the following notation: 
1  -  a vector of  ones 
pm  -  US consumer prices 
r  j  -  the real return in country j 
si  -  the exchange rate (value of  currency j per $US) 
U  -  utility 
W-  real wealth 
xi  -  share of  portfolio held in foreign country j ZI  -  the real return in foreign country j relative to the US 
iil  -  nominal long interest rate in country j (expressed per week) 
ijs  -  nominal short interest rate in country j (expressed per week) 
P 
-  the coefficient of  relative risk aversion 
Q  -  the variance-covariance matrix of  real returns relative to 
the US. 
End-week real wealth is given by 
xt is a 5x1 vector of  foreign currency shares, xi, chosen at time t, while rt+l  is 
a 5x1 vector of  real returns available to the US  investor by investing in 
those countries.  The individual elements of  rt+,  are given by: 
US 
rt+~  is similarly defined, without the exchange rate ratio. 
zt+,  is a 5x1 vector of  real returns relative to the US, given by 
US 
Zt+l = rt+1 - 1  rt+l  ' 
and hence (1)  becomes 
, 
Wt+l  = W, [xtzt+l  + 1  + r;:ll  . 
The mean and variance of  Wt+l  are 
pt+l = Et(Wt+l)  = Wt [xt~(z,+~)  + 1  + ry:ll  and 
The last step follows from the fact that ~(r';l~)  = rEl; by investing in the US 
the investor removes the only  source of  uncertainty - exchange rate 
movements. The variance-covariance matrix of  relative real returns, SZ,  is 
Q = Et(~t+l  - Et(zt+l))  (zt+l  - Et(zt+l))'. 
In order to calculate Etczt+,)  we require a simple and tractable expression for 
the expectation of  exchange rate changes.  Unit-root tests can rarely reject 
the hypothesis that nominal exchange rates follow a random walk with no 
j 
St 
drift (Frankel and Meese, 1987) - which would imply that Et (i)  = 1. 
St+l 
However, these tests are of  low power, and they can rarely reject a range of 
alternative hypotheses. 
From the perspective of  economic theory it seems plausible that, over time, 
nominal exchange rates move to offset differences in inflation.  We use the 
difference  in  long bond  rates  as a  proxy  for  the  expected  inflation 
difference, and assume that, 
Equation (2) implies that each real exchange rate is expected to follow a 
random walk with no drift.3 
Investors maximize  expected  utility  which  is  assumed  to  be  a  linear 
combination of  the expected value and variance of  real wealth.  Thus, 
where p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion evaluated at yt+l.4 
3 Note that equation (2) implies a rejection  of  uncovered interest parity because the 
expected  exchange  rate  change  is  not  determined  by  the  short-term  interest 
differential.  The point of  the paper is to estimate how much is lost by not taking full 
advantage of  the gap between the expected exchange rate change and the short-term 
interest  differential.  The  Discussion  section  examines  an  alternative  to  the 
assumption that the real exchange rate follows a random walk. 
4 Equation (3) embodies the approximation that p  -  ~t  + I . U"(Wt + l)/U'(Wt + 1) = 
-  Wt . U"(Wt + 1)/Ur(Wt  + 1).  This approximation makes the algebra simpler and is 
empirically harmless since 1 <  < 1.01. Maximizing (3) with respect to x,, leads to 5 
Xt = (pa)-I  Et(zt+1). 
This is the key equation which relates the optimal portfolio shares to the 
mean and variance-covariance matrix of  the relative returns. 
(a) Introducing constraints on shares 
The optimal foreign shares derived from (4) are unconstrained;  they can be 
negative and they can sum to more than one (implying a negative share for 
the US). A negative share signifies borrowing, say, US dollars to place in a 
high-yielding low-variance currency. 
We now wish to limit the foreign exposure of  the portfolio and to impose 
the constraint that investors don't sell short in a currency -  that is, that all 
shares are non-negative.  This is one way  to introduce the real-world 
asymmetry that borrowing and lending rates are not  equal.6  Imposing 
these additional constraints, the maximization problem is reformulated as 
follows: 
maximize Et(Ut+l)  = W~[X;E,(Z,+~)  + 1+ ry:l  -  5  x;ax,] 
subject to  xj  2 k  (6) 
and 
j 
Xt 2 0'  (7) 
where k 2 1 is the maximum foreign exposure of  the portfolio. 
Any solution of  this constrained maximization problem must satisfy the 
Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency conditions: 
(a)  E,(U,+l)  is a differentiable and concave function of  x, in the non- 
negative orthant, 
(b)  the constraint function (xil) is differentiable and convex in the non- 
negative orthant, and 
5 Frankel  and Engel  (1984) have an additional term here which  arises  from  their 
assumption of  stochastic US prices. 
6 By  making E,(Z,+~)  the subject of  (4)' it becomes apparent that relative returns are a 
linear  function of  xt, i.e.,  that borrowing and lending rates are assumed to be the 
same. (c)  the following conditions (omitting the time subscript) hold: 
where $ = X;E~(Z,+~,  + I+ ryTl  - '  2 X'QX,  t  + h(k-x$) 
and h  is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (6). 
Condition (a) is satisfied because 
a2E,(u,+l) 
= - pR  and R  is  positive 
axt2 
definite.  Condition (b) is clearly satisfied.  Shares from (4) may satisfy 
constraints  (6) and (7), in which case that is the constrained optimum. 
Otherwise, we derive a solution by alternately eliminating from the analysis 
countries with negative portfolio shares, and, if  constraint (6) is violated, 
imposing it with equality.  The final solution (a 5x1 vector of  non-negative 
portfolio shares) must satisfy all the Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency conditions for 
all countries. 
(b) The cost of near-rationality 
Assume that at time t, strategy a leads the investor to choose the vector of 
portfolio shares xp  and hence to derive expected utility E, (uL1). Further, 
define cl  by the equation 
Finally, define ca as the arithmetic average of  c;,  over the sample.  For any 
given strategy a,  the average equivalent riskless return forgone (AERRF) is 
COP'  - ca, where  COP,  is the value of  ca when a  is the optimal strategy. 
Evaluating the AERRF  allows us to quantify and compare the costs of 
various sub-optimal strategies.  Note  that the loss associated with any 
near-rational strategy consists of  having inappropriate portfolio shares - 
rather than missing out on interest rate changes which may turn out to be 
favourable. 
We wrote a GAUSS program to evaluate the optimal portfolio shares under 
three regimes.  In turn, we assumed that foreign portfolio shares were (i) unconstrained, and hence given by equation (4), or (ii) constrained to be 
non-negative and with a maximum foreign exposure of  100% (i.e., k = 1 in 
equation (6)) or, (iii) constrained to be non-negative and with a maximum 
foreign exposure of  40% (i.e., k = 0.4 in equation (6)).  In each case, we 
evaluated the expected utility cost (AERRF) when the investor optimizes 
every 1,2,3,4,13,26 and 52 weeks.  By  assumption, optimizing every week 
is fully optimal and so the associated AERRF is zero.  The results were 
derived using 302 weeks of  data on short and long-term interest rates, and 
an empirical estimate of  i-2 (see the Data Appendix and the Appendix for 
details).  Figure 1 shows the results assuming p = 2,  10 and 20, as Cecchetti 
and Mark (1990) suggest that there may be a range of  possible values for p.7 
Perhaps the most realistic simulations are those shown in the middle panel 
of  Figure 1, which assume that all portfolio shares (including the US share) 
are non-negative.  Assuming p = 2,  the expected utility cost of  adjusting 
portfolio shares every four weeks averages about 0.0576p.a. while the cost 
of  adjusting every three months (13 weeks) averages about 0.16% p.a.  If 
p > 2,  these costs are even smaller (see Figure 1). 
7  Our  enquiries  suggest  that  many  fund  managers  do not  hold  more  than  a 
proportion k (with k < 1) of  their portfolio overseas - presumably because they are 
risk-averse. In our framework this implies that xtl I  k,  and manipulation of  (4) gives 
p > [(k~)-1  Et(zt+,)ltl.  A money  market corporation (which practices 'active'  portfolio 
management), an insurance company  and a state-government corporation  offered 
upper bounds on the size of  the hypothetical investor's overseas portfolio  share of 
45%, 40% and 20% respectively.  k = 20% (45%) implies p 2 10 (4.4) on average over 
the period.  We  therefore  have  some additional grounds  for experimenting with 
values of  p larger than 2. Figure 1 
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The focus of  this paper is on the expected utility costs of  sub-optimal 
strategies rather than on ex post outcomes.  For periods as long as a year or 
more, the ex post returns from the near-rational strategies we consider are 
sometimes higher than the returns from the fully-optimal strategy.  The 
following  simple  argument  demonstrates why.  Imagine  a  portfolio 
restricted to assets in the US and a single foreign country and assume that 
the expected excess real return in the foreign country is 3%p.a.8 With p = 2, 
and our empirical estimate of  the variance of  real weekly excess returns 
sourced in a foreign country from Table 1 of  about 0.0003, a mean-variance 
optimizing investor will put all of  her portfolio in the foreign country.9 We 
now compare the return from this optimal strategy with the return from the 
sub-optimal "stay-at-home"  strategy of  keeping the whole portfolio in the 
US.  By straightforward calculation using equation (3), the expected utility 
cost of  this stay-at-home strategy is about 1.5%p.a. 
Over a year, the standard deviation of  real returns sourced in the foreign 
country is about I/cI/E  = 12%, while, by assumption, the expected 
excess return is 3%. Over a year, exchange rate shocks are approximately 
normally distributed (Baillie and Bollerslev, 1989).  Hence, the probability 
that, in a randomly chosen year, the stay-at-home strategy will produce a 
higher ex post real return than the optimal strategy is about Pr(z > 1/4) 
where z is a standard normal variable, or about 0.4. 
Thus, judged  by the expected utility derived from it, the stay-at-home 
strategy is very costly  (with an expected utility cost of  about 1.5%p.a. 
compared, for example, with the cost associated with optimizing portfolio 
shares every three months in our six-currency model of  about 0.169Lp.a.). 
Yet, in a randomly chosen year, the stay-at-home strategy outperforms the 
optimal strategy about 40% of  the time.  Even over a five-year period, the 
stay-at-home strategy outperforms the optimal strategy about 29% of  the 
time (Pr(z > $/4)  -  0.29). 
This  is  a substantial expected excess return.  In our model  framework, it would 
occur when the short-term differential between foreign and domestic interest rates is 
3%p.a. larger than the long-term differential. 
Application of  equation (4) gives xt = (0.0006)-I.  0.03/52 = 1. This simple example demonstrates an important point.  Even using five 
years of  data, it is very difficult to distinguish between optimal and near- 
rational strategies using ex post outcomes.10  If  investors choose to invest 
their funds with the portfolio manager who has the best performance in, 
say, the last five  years,  those  managers  who  engage in  near-rational 
behaviour (e.g., those who optimize their portfolio every three months) will 
often be chosen as the best performers.  Hence, they will not disappear from 
the market. 
The standard test of  uncovered interest rate parity is to run the regression 
Ast+,=a+  p (+it*)  +qt+,,  (9) 
where Ast + ,  is the change in the log of  the spot domestic price of  foreign 
exchange over T periods, (it -  it*) is the current interest differential between 
T-period domestic and foreign nominal assets and qt  + ,  is an error term. 
Uncovered  interest  parity  holds  if  P = 1 in the true model (a = 0  is 
sometimes also included as part of  the hypothesis).  The overwhelming 
empirical  finding  is  that  P < 1,  and  often  that  P < 0.  To  give  a 
representative example, Goodhart (1988) estimates equation (9) for nine 
data sets. In six cases out of  nine, the point estimate for P is negative, and in 
five cases out of  nine, the estimate of  p is more than two standard errors 
less than one. By contrast, in no case is P significantly greater than one. 
Almost without exception, empirical rejections of  uncovered interest parity 
use short-term nominal  interest  differentials  in  equation  (9).11  For 
example, in the nine tests of  uncovered interest parity reported above, six 
use one month interest rates while the rest use three month interest rates. 
Provided some nominal interest rate changes are also real interest rate 
changes,  sluggish adjustment  of  portfolio  shares provides  a potential 
10 It is for this reason that we focus instead on expected utility as a measure of  the 
sub-optimality of  the strategies we consider. 
11  By  contrast, interest differentials on longer-term nominal assets provide a much 
better guide to longer-term changes in exchange rates.  Countries with relatively high 
inflation have relatively  high long-term nominal interest rates and their  currencies 
tend to secularly depreciate against the currencies of  low inflation countries.  Thus, 
the failure of  uncovered interest parity is a failure of  the exchange rate to move as 
predicted in the short-term but not in the longer-term.  Froot and Thaler (1990) make 
a similar point. explanation for the failure of  uncovered interest parity.  Most exchange 
rate models (Dornbusch (1976) being the most famous example) predict that, 
other things equal, an increase in domestic real interest rates leads to an 
instantaneous  appreciation  of  the  domestic  exchange  rate.  With  a 
substantial proportion of  investors adjusting sluggishly to changes in 
interest rate differentials, only part of  this appreciation occurs immediately, 
with the rest occurring over a time scale comparable to the time between 
portfolio  adjustments.  Then,  on  average,  the  short-term  interest 
differential will over-predict the subsequent change in the exchange rate, 
i.e., p < 1.  Thus, sluggish adjustment of  portfolio shares also provides a 
potential  explanation for the direction of failure of  uncovered interest 
parity. 
The contribution of  this paper is to demonstrate that, in terms of  expected 
utility, the cost  of  sluggish adjustment  of  portfolio  shares over times 
relevant to tests of  uncovered interest parity is very small indeed. The final 
step in the argument can then take two possible forms.  Either, one can 
appeal to small transactions or opportunity costs of  frequent optimization 
and argue that sluggish adjustment of  portfolio  shares is fully optimal. 
Alternatively, one can argue that, although not fully optimal, sluggish 
portfolio adjustment costs so little that agents who engage in this behaviour 
will not be driven from the market. 
There are several refinements which could be introduced into our model. 
Firstly, the conditional variance-covariance matrix for weekly nominal 
exchange rate  changes is more accurately modelled  as a GARCH(1,l) 
process rather than as a time-invariant matrix (Baillie and Bollerslev, 1989) 
and a similar representation should also be a more accurate model of  real 
excess returns (because the variation  in these returns is dominated by 
nominal exchange rate changes). If  R follows a GARCH process, there will 
be some times when the cost of  near-rationality is underestimated by our 
simpler model and other times when it is overestimated.  Nevertheless, by 
an argument similar to Frankel (1988), our model should give a good 
estimate of  the cost of  near-rationality  averaged over a few months or 
longer. 
Secondly, rather than using equation (2), an alternative modelling strategy 
would have been to follow Frankel and Meese (1987), and assume that each 
real exchange rate follows an AR(1) process.  Using annual data on the real US/UK  exchange rate during the floating period 1973-1984, Frankel and 
Meese derive point estimates for the autoregressive coefficient of  0.720, and 
for the mean absolute deviation of  the real exchange rate of  0.121.  Using 
this model would introduce a correction to equation (2) with an average 
magnitude of  about (0.121) (1 - 0.720)  = 0.034  or 3.4%p.a. While this is a 
substantial correction, provided this underlying model was known to both 
the rational and near-rational investors, it is not clear how much difference 
this refinement would make to the results. 
Finally, the analysis is clearly partial equilibrium in nature.  There is no 
examination of  how the actions of  the representative portfolio investors 
influence the behaviour of  the exchange rates.  We intend to examine this 
link in future research. DATA APPENDIX 
The  empirical  results  in  the  paper  are  derived  from  302  end-week 
observations of  interest rates and exchange rates from 23 December 1983 to 
29 September 1989 inclusive.  We use Friday data unless Friday was a 
holiday, in which case we use the previous trading day's rate. 
Exchange Rates 
All exchange rates (4 p.m., Sydney) are the foreign currency value of  $1US 
from the International Department of  the Reserve Bank of  Australia. 
Short-Term Interest Rates 
3-month interest rates in the Euro-market are chosen as the yield on our 
hypothetical weekly securities. With the exception of  the $A Euro-rate, this 
data was also provided by  the International Department of  the Reserve 
Bank of  Australia.  The $US, #,  Swfr and DM  rates are London rates.  The 
former two refer to the close while the latter two refer to the afternoon. 
The £ rate is a Paris reading (time unspecified). From 2 January 1987, the $A 
rate is the average of  the bid and offer rates made available by Deutsche 
Bank, Sydney (location and time unknown).  Before that, the $A rate is the 
13-week Australian Treasury Note (mid-day) plus the difference between 
the $US 3-month Euro-rate and the $US 3-month Treasury Bill (New York 
close). 
Long-Term Interest Rates 
Before July 1987, the long-term interest rate data for Japan, West Germany, 
the United  Kingdom and Switzerland are taken from the International 
Monetary Fund's 'International Financial Statistics' (IFS).  The IFS  data is 
monthly, so weekly rates are simply the monthly rate repeated four or five 
times.  Since long bond rates change only gradually, the use of  monthly data 
probably introduces minimal error.  Over this period, the definition of  the 
long-rates differs considerably across countries.  In West Germany, the rate 
is the monthly average of  all yields on bonds of  3 or more years duration. 
For Japan, it is the end-month observation on the 7-year bond rate.  The UK 
rate is the Wednesday average over the month of  20-year bond yields, while 
the Swiss rate is based on yields of  10 or more year bonds. 
After June 1987 (and before that in the case of  Australia and the US), weekly 
data  on  10-year  bond  rates  are  available  for  all  countries  except Switzerland.  All  the series are end-week observations at the close of 
business in the relevant financial centres: New  York,  Tokyo, Frankfurt, 
London, Zurich and Sydney.  The IFS monthly data is used over the whole 
period for Switzerland. 
APPENDIX 
1. Estimation of R 
The variance-covariance matrix of  real relative returns, R, is defined as 
u  S 
Q = Et(zt+,  - Et(zt+l))  (zt+l  - Et(zt+l))',  where zt+l  = rt+l  - 1  r,+,.  To derive 
empirical estimates of  R, we use a sample average of  z, for E,(Z,+~).  Because 
US inflation was relatively stable over the sample period, rather than using 
actual data, we assume that  US  inflation  is fixed  at  0.075% per  week 
(equivalent to 4% p.a.).  Over a week, exchange rate changes -  rather than 
changes in the US inflation rate -  dominate the variance-covariance  of 
relative real returns on a portfolio of  short-term nominal assets.  Table 1 
displays the empirically estimated matrix R using our 302 weeks of  data." 
TABLE  1 
THE VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX, R, 
OF WEEKLY REAL RETURNS RELATIVE TO THE US 
l2 Prof.W.E.Griffiths  pointed  out to  us  that  calculating  R  in this  manner  gives 
investors the benefit of  information they do not yet have.  We have established that 
continually updated estimates of  R based on available information makes negligible 
difference to our estimates of  the average cost of  near-rational strategies. 2.  Alternative examples of  near-rationality 
In  this section  of  the Appendix, we estimate the  cost  of  two further 
examples of  near-rational behaviour: "covariance  blindness",  and small 
mistakes in the formation of  exchange rate expectations. 
To  estimate  the  cost  of  covariance  blindness,  we  assume  that  our 
representative investor uses the covariance matrix from Table 1 with all 
off-diagonal elements of  R  set to zero when choosing shares. 
In  our final example of  near-rational behaviour, the investor makes an 
unsystematic error when forming exchange rate expectations.  Equation (2) 
is replaced by: 
where el are independent normally distributed errors with zero mean and a 
standard deviation of  1%  p.a. 
Of  course, to estimate the average expected utility derived from these two 
near-rational strategies, we use the "true" model (which involves using the 
complete matrix R  from Table 1 along with equation (2) for exchange rate 
expectations). Again, the cost associated with a sub-optimal strategy arises 
from holding inappropriate portfolio shares.  Figure 2 shows the costs of 
these two near-rational strategies. 
As in the text, the size of  the expected utility costs are small. Assuming p = 2, 
the average cost of  ignoring the expected covariance between returns is less 
than 0.1  %p.a., while the penalty for making errors in the calculation of 
expected exchange rate changes of  around 1  %p.a. is about 0.3%p.a. Note, 
however,  that  if  the expectational errors are substantially  larger  than 
l%p.a.  on average, the expected utility costs will be correspondingly larger. 
Taken at face value, survey data on exchange rate expectations (Frankel 
and Froot (1987)) suggest that expectational biases are of ten substantially 
larger than l%p.a. Figure 2 
COSTS FOR NEAR RATIONAL INVESTORS 
(All shares are non-negative and foreign shares sum to no more than 100%) 
p=2  p = 10  p = 20 
p = Coefficient of relative risk aversion REFERENCES 
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